Eroding presidential term limits through unconstitutional constitutional amendments in Africa: A comparative legal analysis of selected African jurisdictions

In several African states, constitutional amendments have been used to erode presidential term limits, facilitating democratic backsliding under the guise of legality. Although these amendments may conform to formal constitutional procedures, they often undermine foundational democratic principles and the spirit of constitutionalism. This article examined how incumbents strategically manipulate constitutional amendment processes to abolish or extend term limits, thereby consolidating personal rule. It assessed the utility of the doctrine of unconstitutional constitutional amendments, particularly the Basic Structure Doctrine, as a judicial mechanism to resist such anti-democratic manoeuvres. Drawing on a comparative analysis of selected African jurisdictions, including Uganda, Rwanda, Benin, Kenya, and the Central African Republic, the study evaluated the varying judicial responses to term limit circumvention. The findings reveal contrasting judicial approaches. While courts in Benin and the Central African Republic have invoked foundational constitutional values to invalidate such amendments, others have exercised restraint or deferred to executive authority. The article advocates for the formal recognition of the Basic Structure Doctrine within African constitutional frameworks, the entrenchment of presidential term limits, and the enhancement of judicial independence. It further calls for civic education and the cultivation of political norms that support leadership alternation. By offering doctrinal and policy-based insights, the article contributes to the discourse on constitutional resilience and judicial protection of democracy in Africa.