Political Elites and the Contested Constitutionalization of Federalism in South Sudan: Power, Identity and Strategic Ambiguity

This article attempts to examine the process of the “constitutionalization” of federalism and its implications for governance and peacebuilding as seen in the eyes of political elites. The study is of convergent mixed methods design which involves the use of a survey, key informant interviews, focus group discussions, and documentary analysis. The findings suggest that political power, resource interests, political survival, identity, coalition dynamics and evolving political opportunities influence elite federalism involvement. Nevertheless 79.5%-84.0% of the respondents felt that elite opposition to federalism was characterized by a desire for central authority and political control, and 72.7% indicated that there was a gap between elite endorsement and action. Elite perspectives were also significantly associated with perceived peacebuilding outcomes (R = .433; R² = .188; p < .001), while the addition of governance factors increased the explanatory power of the model to R² = .288. The article demonstrates that federalism is not merely a constitutional design exercise but a political process. It elaborates the concept of Strategic Constitutional Ambiguity to shed light on how unresolved constitutional issues can preserve room for manoeuvre, delay the redistribution of power, and keep political options open. It also theorizes managed incompleteness as a condition in which political accommodation can be maintained even when institutional settlement remains incomplete. In turn, durable federalism requires converting political compromises into joint, participatory, and institutionalized governance.