Dissociation From the Common Purpose – The Ambit of the Defence in South African Law
Résumé
The doctrine of common purpose helps facilitate criminal prosecutions involving collective criminal conduct. Its utility is evident where more than one person participates in the commission of a crime, making it difficult to prove a direct causal connection between the act of a particular accused and the ensuing harm. The doctrine’s utility in collective criminal conduct accounts for the apparent ubiquity of common purpose, along with its ringing endorsement by the Constitutional Court in a range of decisions. The increased facility of conviction brought about by application of the common-purpose doctrine in turn shifts the spotlight onto the question whether an accused, having initially associated with a common purpose to commit a crime, can rely on a defence that can exclude criminal liability for participation in group conduct. This is particularly significant in light of the fact that an initial common purpose to commit a particular crime can expand to encompass a different crime. Such a defence, which serves an important legitimating function for the doctrine, does exist, and is known as dissociation or withdrawal from the common purpose. Once an accused has associated themself with a common purpose, whether such common purpose arises as a result of a prior agreement or by active association), it is required that they dissociate (or voluntarily withdraw) themself from the common purpose to avoid criminal liability for the ultimate harm committed by the group.
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