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5G and Beyond Wireless Network Optimization through RIS Technology: A Pricing Game

Article scientifique 2023 Sciences de l'ingénieur et technologies Anglais

Résumé

Abstract This paper aims to improve wireless networks beyond 5G by solving problems such as dead zone connections, physical layer security, and high costs with the aid of reconfigurable intelligent surfaces (RISs). Trusted RIS holders could purchase the copyrights of RIS technology from wireless service providers, their competitive behaviors were simulated using a non-cooperative pricing game to optimize the utility of the pricing structure. RIS holders were supposed to be bounded rational and base their decisions on past strategies. This selfish action was framed as a duopoly game of bounded rationality with history. To ensure fairness, the solution to this game was defined as the Nash equilibrium, but maintaining the stability of this solution was difficult. The local stability of the solution was analyzed. Numerical simulations showed that RIS holders who possessed story-awareness were more likely to attain Nash equilibrium, and its stability region became larger for specific story weights and RIS size values. Next, a basin of attraction graph simulated the effect of history on the global stability of Nash equilibrium. The study provided information to RIS holders to minimize the cost of installing RIS on their own or rented properties while transmitting more radio spectrum to users.

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Daoudi, L., Baslam, M., Zagour, M., & Safi, S. (2023). 5G and Beyond Wireless Network Optimization through RIS Technology: A Pricing Game. Research Square. https://doi.org/10.21203/rs.3.rs-3483690/v1

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