Accès ouvert · CC BY

Oversubscription, Enrolment Penalties and the Right of Access to Higher Education

Article scientifique 2026 Sciences juridiques et politiques Autre

Résumé

Not only are the financial barriers in higher (or tertiary) education real, but they are often exacerbated by funding models and public universities’ dependence on government funding (being first-stream income). Generally, public universities are encouraged to find alternative funding and look towards second- and third-stream income sources to supplement government funding. Although this provides avenues to reduce public universities’ dependence on government funding, it does not address the systemic barriers within the government grant model, particularly those related to teaching input units and enrolment-planning structures. The financial penalties for material deviation from the agreed enrolment numbers are significant, and although there may be good reasons for implementing penalties, such a penalty-driven compliance structure has the unintended consequence that deserving students are often barred from furthering their studies at a public university. This was illustrated in the cases of Mbana v Walter Sisulu University, Genukile v Walter Sisulu University and Mnqandi v Walter Sisulu University, where prospective students were not allowed to register at the university as the particular programme for which they had been admitted had been oversubscribed. Although these cases were decided on the assessment of the contractual principle of “offer and acceptance”, the underlying reason for not allowing such enrolments in oversubscribed programmes can be linked to the far-reaching impact of the financial penalties for material deviation from enrolment numbers. In these circumstances, prospective students are left with limited (and often no) recourse to solutions from public universities, as well as to consumer-protection laws and the underlying contractual principles that regulate admissions and registrations. To make matters worse, public universities’ hands are effectively tied in that enrolling prospective students in oversubscribed programmes triggers financial penalties from the government, which in turn threatens the institution’s financial sustainability. This leaves many students in the current educational structure with no recourse and effectively functions as a systemic barrier to education. Measured against section 29(1)(b) of the Constitution, read with article 13(2)(c) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, it is argued that the penalty-driven compliance model is difficult to defend, and that its re-evaluation is a matter for government rather than the universities (which are financially constrained by the compliance model).

Citer ce document

Eck, M. V. (2026). Oversubscription, Enrolment Penalties and the Right of Access to Higher Education. Obiter. https://doi.org/10.17159/r1vey317

Exporter : BibTeX · RIS (Zotero, Mendeley, EndNote)

Accès au document

Texte intégral archivé sur SPHAERO, en accès ouvert : lisible gratuitement en ligne après connexion. Le document reste aussi disponible à sa source. Se connecter

Voir l'article sur le site de la revue

Licence et provenance

Licence : CC BY

Notice moissonnée depuis OpenAlex le 26/10/2026. Le document reste hébergé par sa source.
Voir le document à la source →

Auteur(s)

Statistiques

Consultations (hors robots) : 8

Téléchargements (hors robots) : 0

Méthode de comptage