Review of: "Free Will Stands When Properly Explained and Correctly Defined and Neuroscience Shows This to Be the Case"
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Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.Dr Knowles has chosen a topic of great metaphysical importance and has offered an interesting method to solve the problem of whether or there is something like 'free will'.She suggests that if the standard definition/s of free will is revised in the way she explains that, using this new definition of 'free will' in the Libet experiments the experiments would show that free will does, in fact, exist.She invokes both the large area of conceptual work done in philosophy on free will (spanning the Greeks 400 B.C. to modern philosophy in the form of Kant and Locke and later Wittgenstein) as well as the knowledge derived from scientific work on free will, i.e. the Libet experiments.
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